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Abstract 
Using data from China Water Institution and Management (CWIM) survey, the study first 
constructs measures of all three most studied dimensions of social capital: trust, networks, and 
norms. The study then examines if social capital has any predictive powers of individual farmers’ 
contribution decisions as well as farmers’ contributions aggregated at the village level. Farmers’ 
choices between different forms of contributions (labor versus cash) are also analyzed. Our results 
suggest that all three dimensions of social capital explain farmers’ contribution decisions. 
Governance quality of local irrigation systems and the norm of cooperation have strong predictive 
powers of farmers’ decisions to contribute. Strongly agree other villagers can be trusted is 
positively correlated with farmers’ decisions to contribute cash instead of labor and the share of 
total cash investment at village level contributed by farmers.  
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1 Introduction 
Increasing irrigation investment is a crucial step for countries that rely on irrigation but are 
facing water shortage problems. Recent surveys of world leaders of business and government have 
consistently ranked water crisis among the top three global risks in terms of its impact (World 
Economic Forum 2017). Since agricultural irrigation accounts for 70% of all water withdrawals 
globally (World Bank 2017), actions within the agricultural sector are necessary to alleviate water 
stress. Improving on-farm irrigation efficiency is the most widely proposed solution.1 However, 
irrigation systems, especially at the tertiary levels where water is delivered to farmers’ fields, have 
underperformed in many developing countries due to inadequate investment in maintaining or 
rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure (Davis and Hirji 2003). Since more efficient use of water 
often requires new irrigation investments, such as lining canals or installing water measurement 
equipment along the canals, and public spending on irrigation has declined in the early 1990s (e.g., 
Meizen-Dick and Rosegrant 2005), irrigation investments in maintaining current infrastructure and 
building new infrastructure are urgently needed to improve agricultural water use efficiency in 
developing countries (FAO 2016). 
The role of farmers as investors of irrigation systems has become more important, partly 
due to the reforms that took place in irrigation sectors in the past few decades. Since the 1980s, 
the responsibility of managing local irrigation systems have been transferred from upper-level 
governments to farmer-run organizations such as Water User Associations (WUAs) or irrigator 
                                                          
1 Recent studies have questioned whether more efficient irrigation would result in reduced consumptive water use 
(e.g., Pfeiffer and Lin 2014). Unintended consequences such as the expansion of irrigated acreage, increased 
evapotranspiration of existing crops and shifts to more water intensive crops could all result in higher overall 
consumptive water use. However, Huang, Wang, and Li (2017) show that at least in the context of China where 
farmers are limited in their capacity to expand farm size and do not seem to adjust their crop mixes, the use of water 
saving technologies does have the potential to reduce water use, given the currently low levels of on-farm irrigation 
efficiency.     
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associations through Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), or shared between upper-level 
governments and local users through Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) intended to 
increase farmers’ participation in irrigation management (FAO 2007; Senanayake, Mukherji, and 
Giordano 2015). The rationale of PIM and IMT programs is that local agents have better local 
knowledge and can do a better job matching the provision of irrigation services with local 
demands. Other changes have also pushed up the importance of farmers’ contributions to irrigation 
investments. For example, in rural China, a series of fiscal reforms that started in 1994 have 
stripped village leaders of the financial resources they used to have for irrigation investment, which 
left an investment void that the central government hoped contributions from farmers would fill 
(Boyle, Huang, and Wang 2014). 
Three branches of literature can offer insights on which factors may boost farmers’ 
investment in irrigation systems. The first branch of literature examines which factors affect the 
successes of collective action in managing irrigation systems as local commons (e.g., Meizen-
Dick, Raju, and Gulati 2002; Fujiie, Hayami, and Kikuchi 2005; Araral 2009; Nagrah, Chaudhry, 
and Giordano 2016). As a typical type of common property resource (CPRs) or local commons 
(Ostrom 1990), many aspects of irrigation system management, including operation and 
maintenance (O&M) and investments, often require the successful coordination of collective 
action among users. Previous studies have identified a large set of factors that may influence the 
likelihood of collective action (e.g., Meinzen-Dick, Raju, and Gulati 2002; Araral 2009). Meinzen-
Dick (2007) groups these factors into social and economic settings, characteristics of irrigation 
systems and water supply, characteristics of governance systems, and characteristics of irrigation 
system users. The second branch of literature focuses on public goods provision in general (e.g., 
Leonard, Croson, and de Oliveira 2010; Tu et al. 2011; Li and Wang 2013; Cai, Zhu, and Chen 
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2016) and the third branch of literature focuses on conservation and management of community 
natural resources (e.g., Pretty and Ward 2001; Pretty 2003; Cramb 2005; Nepal, Bohara, and 
Berrens 2007; Bodin and Crona 2008; Bouma, Bulte, and van Soest 2008; Ishihara and Pascual 
2009; Beekman and Bulte 2012; Willy and Holm-Müller 2013). Studies in the second and third 
branches of literature share a common interest on a particular factor, social capital. Only a few 
studies in the first branch of literature studying collective action in managing irrigation systems 
have touched on the concept of social capital (e.g., Meinzen-Dick, Raju, and Gulati 2002). 
Although there is no consensus among scholars on what constitutes social capital, most 
studies cite the definition put forward by Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993): “Social capital 
here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, which can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.” In some sense, programs like 
IMT and PIM can be seen as attempts to develop trust, change norms and build networks of 
resource users (Pretty 2003). Ostrom (1990) summarizes eight design principles (or essential 
elements) that could have accounted for the successes of the long-enduring, self-organized, and 
self-governed CRPs she studied. Among these principles are participation of those affected in 
modifying the operational rules, mechanisms of monitoring, sanctions, and conflict resolution. 
Elements of social capital could be conducive to successful collective action by reducing the 
transaction costs of acting collectively, such as the costs of monitoring and enforcement to prevent 
or punish free-riding behavior, and encouraging participation/cooperation among community 
members (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Jones, Malesios, and Botetzagias 2009). In 
communities with high levels of trust, an individual can trust other members to reciprocate his/her 
voluntary contributions instead of having to invest time or money to monitor others (Putnam, 
Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Pretty 2003; Bouma, Bulte, and van Soest 2008). By reducing the 
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need for monitoring, trust could lower transaction costs and increase the likelihood of cooperation. 
The most important way networks can facilitate collective action is the transmission of information 
across individuals about the trustworthiness of others (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; 
Ostrom and Ahn 2008). Past interactions occurred in networks generate such reputational 
information. Networks also lower the cost of gathering such information by allowing it to become 
transitive, that is, the trust in a particular individual can be derived from other network members’ 
trust in him/her (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Networks can also facilitate cooperation in 
other ways. Communication among members of the same network can increase awareness of 
community needs (Leonard, Croson, and de Oliveira 2010). Private benefits an individual can gain 
from involvement in social networks (e.g., better employment outcomes) increase the costs of free-
riding through channels such as social ostracism (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Norms, 
especially those that define rules and expected behavior of resource uses have more direct links to 
collective action. Norms of reciprocity signal that most community members are trustworthy 
(Ostrom and Ahn 2008). Norms of cooperation encourage participation in collective activities 
(Coleman 1990; Beekman and Bulte 2012). Strong norms of sanction can deter free-riding 
behavior (Ostrom 1990). 
Previous studies have provided empirical evidence on the positive influence of all three 
dimensions of social capital (e.g., Nepal, Bohara, and Berrens 2007; Bodin and Crona 2008; 
Bouma, Bulte, and van Soest 2008; Beekman and Bulte 2012; Willy and Holm-Müller 2013). The 
findings of no effects are also common. Furthermore, studies have pointed out that a high level of 
social capital does not necessarily provide favorable conditions for collective action. For example, 
strong networks among the dominant group of a community may exclude members of 
marginalized groups from participating in collective action (Ishihara and Pascual 2009). In India 
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and Nepal, rules of community forestry groups and norms of the societies have excluded women 
from meaningful participation (Agrawal 2001). In short, the links between social capital and 
collective action are empirical in nature and should be done in a context-specific fashion. 
Using the case of surface water irrigation systems in rural China, this study aims to examine 
if social capital has any predictive powers of farmers’ decisions to contribute to irrigation 
investment. Individual farmers’ contribution decisions as well as farmers’ contribution aggregated 
at the village level are studied. In addition, farmers’ choices between different forms of 
contributions (labor versus cash) are also analyzed. The study contributes to the literature in several 
ways. First, this study adds to the literature on collective action in irrigation management by 
studying farmers’ investment behavior. With a few exceptions (e.g., Boyle, Huang, and Wang 
2014), most previous research focuses on farmers’ contributions toward O&M of irrigation 
systems (e.g., Meizen-Dick, Raju, and Gulati 2002; Fujiie, Hayami, and Kikuchi 2005; Araral 
2009; Nagrah, Chaudhry, and Giordano 2016). In many developing countries, farmers’ 
involvement in O&M of irrigation systems is common. Irrigation investments, on the other hand, 
may be customarily considered as the responsibility of governments. Thus, how to boost farmers’ 
contributions to irrigation investment is a crucial policy question and a more challenging task. 
Findings from this study can provide useful policy advice on the topic. 
Second, this study also contributes to the literature that examines the relationship between 
social capital and public good provisions and management of community natural resources 
management. Even though social capital is a multi-faceted concept, most studies only include a 
sub-set of its components in their analysis. Most often only social networks (e.g., Cramb 2005; 
Nepal, Bohara, and Berrens 2007; Cai, Zhu, and Chen 2016) or trust (e.g., Bouma, Bulte, and van 
Soest 2008; Tu et al. 2011) is used to measure social capital. Such an approach may not accurately 
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capture the influence of social capital. For example, in the study of a rural fishing village in Kenya, 
Bodin and Crona (2008) find that the community has a relatively high level of social capital if it 
were only assessed using social network measures. However, the community also has the strong 
norm of not reporting rule-breaking behaviors, which is not in favor of sustainable resource 
management. Furthermore, the reluctance to report rule-breaking behaviors is partly due to the 
strength of social networks in the community. Then analysis that only includes social networks 
and omits social norms may generate biased estimates of the effect of social networks. Our analysis 
improves the operationalization of the concept of social capital by including all three dimensions: 
networks, trust, and norms. In addition, we use measures of social capital that are more relevant 
for the activity under study, i.e., village level irrigation system management. For example, in 
addition to the number of friends and relatives a farmer has and the density of social networks of 
non-water-related associations, a measure of water-related networks is also included. Instead of 
general measures of social norms such as civic participation, our study measures norms that are 
important in irrigation management such as those related to farmers’ participation in O&M 
activities, conflict resolution and monitoring. 
Third, a unique feature of the study is that we distinguish different forms of contributions 
farmers can make. In particular, we study famers’ choices between cash and labor contributions. 
It is common in many developing countries, such as China and the Philippines, for farmers to 
contribute money for irrigation fees and voluntary labor for O&M (e.g., Araral 2009; Boyle, 
Huang, and Wang 2014). In Indonesia, households pay membership fees to various associations 
either in cash or in kind including labor contribution (Grootaert 1999). Cash contribution differs 
from labor contribution in several aspects. When a farmer contributes labor, he/she works with 
other farmers on irrigation projects together. Farmers’ labor contributions are easily observable to 
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each other through their physical presence in the teamwork. Cash contribution, in contrast, is less 
observable unless such information is made public. In addition, cash contribution runs the risk of 
embezzlement and so factors such as trust in the agents in charge of irrigation management may 
matter more. The trends in the economic development of many developing countries such as better 
access to off-employment opportunities may tip farmers’ preferences toward cash contribution by 
increasing their opportunity costs of time. Araral (2009) is among the few studies that investigate 
both monetary and labor free riding in collective action in irrigation O&M activities. However, 
monetary and labor free riding are analyzed separately. Our study analyzes the joint choice of 
whether to contribute and what to contribute (cash or labor). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background 
information on the funding structure of village level irrigation systems in rural China. Section 3 
describes data and measures of social capital used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the 
empirical strategies. Section 5 reports estimation results and discusses findings, while Section 6 
presents conclusions and limitations of the study. 
2 Village-level surface water irrigation systems in China 
Surface water irrigation systems in China consist of larger irrigation systems and village-
level irrigation systems. The former includes main canals that divert water from major rivers and 
branch and lateral canals that divert water from main canals into villages. The Ministry of Water 
Resources of China, water resource bureaus (WRBs) at various levels (provinces, prefectures, 
counties, and townships) and irrigation districts (IDs) are responsible for the construction, O&M 
and other activities such as upgrading of the larger irrigation systems. Following Boyle, Huang, 
and Wang (2014), these administrative units are referred to as upper-level governments in the 
study. 
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Our focus is village-level irrigation systems consisting of tertiary canals within villages 
that deliver water directly into farmers’ fields. Before the 2000s, a top-down approach was used 
in the funding of village-level irrigation projects. In the political environment where easing 
farmers’ burden takes the top priority, irrigation fees paid by farmers are still at levels far below 
the cost of supplying water and thus are not sufficient for funding irrigation projects (Lohmar et 
al. 2003; Boyle, Huang, and Wang 2014). Instead, funding comes from three major groups of 
stakeholders: upper-level governments (through fiscal transfers), village leaders, and farmers 
(Bolye, Huang, and Wang 2014). Village leaders could utilize coffers of village revenues from 
agricultural tax revenues, various fees and surcharges levied on farmers, and other sources such as 
village enterprise revenues. Village leaders also had the authority to mobilize mandatory labor 
contributions from farmers (corvée labor) for village level irrigation projects. Farmers’ 
contributions, either in the form of fees and surcharges levied on them or in the form of corvée 
labor, were largely mandatory in nature. 
A series of reforms in China has changed the funding structure of village level irrigation 
projects. The fiscal recentralization started in 1994 significantly reduced the share of tax revenues 
accrued to villages (Wong 1997). The tax-for-fee reform in the early 2000s stripped village leaders 
of the authority to levy fees and surcharges on farmers (Oi et al. 2012). By the end of 2006, 
agricultural tax was completely eliminated (Oi et al. 2012). These fiscal reforms have significantly 
shrunk the size of the fiscal resources village leaders previously had and led to a sharp decline in 
irrigation investment nationwide (Liu 2004). In response, fiscal transfers from upper-level 
governments were increased to fund public goods in the village (Boyle, Huang, and Wang 2014). 
In addition, the central government started to promote a new funding mechanism of “run by local 
people with assistance from the state” (i.e., partnership between farmers and upper level 
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governments) and stipulated that funds should be allocated on a “project-by-project assessment” 
where farmers voluntarily contribute to local public goods (CCCPC and General Office of the 
State Council of China 2005; MFC and MWR 2005). In the 2000s, many provincial governments 
also started to limit or remove the authority village leaders had to mobilize corvée labor (Oi et al. 
2012). With these reforms, the role of village leaders in local public goods provisions is 
significantly weakened. More importantly, farmers make contributions to irrigation investment on 
a voluntary basis. 
Under the new funding structure, the importance of addressing the provision problem 
associated with CPRs or local commons (Ostrom 1990) is highlighted. Members of a village 
cannot be excluded from access to its irrigation systems without costly enforcement. The difficulty 
of exclusion creates incentives for farmers to free ride on O&M efforts as well as any investments 
to improve the irrigation systems. The temptation to avoid contributing to the provisions of 
irrigation systems, the provision problem, is exacerbated by the changes brought on by the reforms, 
in particular, the now voluntary nature of famers’ contributions. In fact, studies have documented 
low rates of participation in irrigation matters (Zhang and He 2008) and low levels of contributions 
by farmers post reforms (Boyle, Huang, and Wang 2014). How to boost farmers’ voluntary 
contributions necessities the study of potential factors that could lead to the successful coordination 
of collective action in the specific context of rural China. 
3 Data and variable construction 
Data used in the study come from the China Water Institution and Management (CWIM) 
survey. The sample areas covered three provinces in two important river basins in North China: 
Ningxia province in the upper reaches of Yellow River Basin (YRB), Henan province in the middle 
reaches of YRB and Hebei province covering most of the Hai River Basin and surrounding Beijing. 
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Within each province, a stratified random sampling strategy was used to select villages with 
varying degrees of water scarcity. In Ningxia province, five counties were randomly selected from 
two irrigation districts (ID). One ID is near where the Yellow River enters the province and the 
other is in the central area of the province. In Henan province, counties were randomly selected 
from IDs at varying distances to the Yellow River, which is highly correlated with the degree of 
water scarcity. Groundwater is the major source of irrigation water in Hebei province. One county 
was randomly selected from each of the three zones with varying degree of groundwater 
abundance: the coastal belt (scarcest), the inland belt next to the mountain area (most abundant), 
and the zone between the coastal belt and the mountain area. After the sample counties were 
selected, 88 villages were randomly selected from the sample counties. Since this study focuses 
on surface water irrigation projects investment, only villages that use surface water for irrigation 
are included in the analysis. The final sample used in the empirical analysis includes 189 
households from 52 sample villages (32 in Ningxia, 13 in Henan, and 7 in Hebei). 
In the CWIM survey, enumerators interviewed four types of respondents: village leaders, 
four randomly selected households per village, canal managers, and well operators. Separate 
survey questionnaires were administered to each respondent and answers were not disclosed to 
other respondents. Information collected in the interviews with village leaders, farmers, and canal 
managers is used to construct variables used in the empirical analysis. Farmers were asked if they 
contributed to investment in building surface water infrastructure and the form of the contributions 
they made (cash, unpaid labor, or both). Some examples of investment include building new 
canals, lining canals, purchase and installation of water measurement equipment, purchase of other 
equipment such as pumps and engines, drainage equipment and gates. Village leaders were also 
asked to report out of the total amount invested, how much come from farmers. Answers to these 
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questions are used to construct the dependent variables in the empirical analysis. Table 1 reports 
descriptions and summary statistics of variables. 
3.1 Construction of social capital measures  
Information collected in the CWIM survey allows us to construct variables to measure the 
three most studied dimensions of social capital: networks, trust, and norms. Partly because 
networks are the most tangible part of social capital, they have been included in many studies on 
social capital. Types of social networks matter in that the flow and the quality of information 
exchanged are often different among different types of social networks (Granovetter 2005). A large 
part of the social network in rural China is based on kinship (Tu et al. 2011; Cai, Zhu, and Chen 
2016). Although such network with direct and frequent contacts can help farmers reach consensus 
and achieve behavioral consistency partly by repeatedly spreading homogeneous information 
(Granovetter 1973), in-network members may converge to a level of public good provision that is 
sub-optimal (Cai, Zhu, and Chen 2016). In addition, it may exclude other members of the 
community that are also relevant stakeholders in providing local public goods (Tu et al. 2011). In 
contrast, broad social networks that measure the connections among larger groups of people and 
serve to spread new and heterogeneous information may be more relevant for public good 
provisions. Furthermore, social network that provides more relevant information for the activity 
under study is more likely to have an impact. Nepal, Bohara, and Berrens (2007) show empirically 
social networks such as forest user groups provide critical information about forest conservation 
and have the largest and positive impact on households’ tree-planting behavior in rural Nepal, 
while other social networks that are remotely or not related to forest conservation have smaller or 
no impacts. 
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In our analysis, three measures are used to characterize social networks in sample areas. 
The first two measure close and broad social network. The density of close social network is 
measured by the number of relatives or friends will provide support if a farmer is having financial 
difficulties. Broad social networks are often built through involvement in social groups in the 
communities. This study looks at five types of non-water-related associations in villages: farmers’ 
association, women’s associations, religious groups, culture groups (e.g., dance teams) and other 
groups. Instead of just totaling up the number of such associations to indicate their presence or 
absence, following Nepal, Bohara, and Berrens (2007), we use information on three components 
of an association to reflect the strength and density of the network: number of years in operation 
(stability), number of members (coverage), and frequency of activities (effectiveness). Define xnj, 
min(xnj), and max(xnj) as the actual, minimum possible, and maximum possible values of the n
th 
component of an association (n = 1, 2, 3) in village j. Then the index for the mth non-water 
association, NAmj, is: 
NAmj = ∑
xnj –  min (xnj)
max( xnj) – min (xnj)
n
1  
(1) 
Then adding up the indices for all non-water associations gives the adjusted number of non-water-
related associations, which is used to measure the density of broad social networks in the village.  
The third measure of network is embedded as an element in the governance structure of 
local irrigation systems. In rural China, local irrigation systems could be governed in three 
different ways, often distinguished by the type of agents in charge: WUAs, canal contractors, or 
village leaders (Huang et al. 2009). WUAs are considered as the type of social network most 
relevant for irrigation investment. Some villages have more than one type of governance. For 
example, within the same village, some canals are contracted out to individual farmers who 
manage the canals for a profit, while others are managed by WUAs. In other villages, WUAs may 
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jointly manage a canal with village leaders. Boyle, Huang, and Wang (2014) use a dummy variable 
to indicate the existence of WUAs or contracting in their analysis of the levels and shares of 
irrigation investment from village collective, upper level government or farmers. However, the 
difference between different governance systems may only exist in names. For example, a large 
overlap between the leadership of WUA and village leaders is often observed in rural China 
(Huang et al. 2009). Therefore, it is important to use measures that reflect the quality of 
governance. To construct such an index, we follow the approached used to construct the composite 
index for broad social network. Instead of just indicating the presence of one or more types of 
governance systems, we adjust the number using three informational components. The first 
component is years in operation. The sub-index is scaled by the maximum possible length of time 
a governance system could have been in place so that it is bounded between 0 and 1. For example, 
the first WUA was established in south China in 1995 with the assistance of the World Bank 
(2003). So at most a WUA could be 17 years old. The sub-index is 1 if village leaders are in charge 
since this is the traditional way irrigation systems are managed in rural China. The second 
component, information transparency, is measured by out of three types of information (total 
amount of water fees collected, total amount of water use, and total irrigated areas), how much 
information is made public to all farmers. The sub-index for information transparency can take on 
the values of 0, 1/3, 2/3 or 1. The third component is a dummy variable indicating managers are 
elected by farmers (in contrast to be appointed by village leaders or by township or county 
governments). The final index for governance quality is the sum of all the sub-indices for all types 
of governance systems in the village. 
The second dimension of social capital, trust, is also analyzed in many studies. One of the 
most commonly used measure of trust is constructed using answers to the trust question from the 
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World Value Survey: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Results are mixed on whether such attitudinal 
survey-based measures of trust reflect actual trusting behavior. Glaeser et al. (2000) find that trust 
measured this way is not a good predicator of trusting behavior in economic exchange revealed in 
trust games. Rather it measures trustworthiness. Anderson, Mellor and Milyo (2004), however, 
find that agreement with the statement that “most people can be trusted” does have predictive 
powers of contributions in a public-goods experiment. Leonard, Croson, and de Oliveira (2010) 
suggest that when examining the relationship between trust and voluntary contributions to local 
charitable organizations, it makes more sense to measure an individual’s trust in other members of 
the same community, who are the users and potential providers of local services. Given these 
insights from the literature, attitudinal survey-based measures of trust are used in this study but the 
trust questions are only asked about relevant stakeholders of the local irrigation systems, instead 
of the general population. In rural China, two groups of agents are relevant in the provision of local 
irrigation services: village leaders who often make investment decisions and farmers whose role 
as contributors have become more important. Two questions were used in the 2011 round of the 
CWIM survey: “Do you agree that most villagers can be trusted?” and “Do you agree that village 
leaders can be trusted?” Most farmers (77%) answered “Agreed” to the statement that most 
villagers can be trust (Table 1). A much smaller share of farmers (19%) answered “Strongly agree” 
to the same statement. Similarly, most farmers (71%) answered “Agree” but few farmers (13%) 
answered “Strongly agree” to the statement that village leaders can be trusted. The high trust level 
observed in our data is consistent with findings in other studies in China (e.g., Tu et al. 2011) and 
also observed in other developing countries such as Burundi (Beekman and Bulte 2012). 
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Out of all three dimensions of social capita, norms are the least clearly defined and are 
often omitted in empirical studies of social capital. In the literature on the management of CPRs, 
norms are usually defined as the aspects of social capital that can enhance the ability of local 
communities to self-regulate. Empirically, they are characterized as mechanisms for conflict 
resolution and monitoring (Ostrom1990; Bodin and Crona 2008). In our analysis, the norm of 
conflict resolution is measured by a dummy variable that equals one if village leaders resolve water 
allocation conflicts and zero if farmers resolve conflicts by themselves. Another dummy variable 
is used for the norm related to monitoring, which equals one a farmer said he/she would report 
rule-breaking in water use behavior (e.g., not taking turns in water allocation or water theft) if 
he/she observed it. In addition, two dummy variables are used to measure norms related to 
cooperation in the village: villagers mitigate extreme weather shocks on their own and villagers 
cooperate to mitigate extreme weather shocks.2 
Several studies (e.g., Jones, Malesios, and Botetzagias 2009; Beekman and Bulte 2012) 
also include political participation (voted or not) as a proxy for social norms. Instead of measuring 
participation in general political matters, we measure farmers’ participation in activities more 
relevant to activities under study. For each of the nine major canal operation and maintenance tasks 
(such as cleaning canals, distributing water, and collecting water fees), canal managers were asked 
to list who were in charge. Pre-coded answers include village leader, WUAs, canal managers, 
farmers and others. Canal managers can choose multiple answers. The degree of farmers’ 
participation in irrigation management is measured by the number of tasks farmers are fully or 
partially in charge. 
                                                          
2 These variables are constructed from answers to the survey question “If village wide extreme weather events (such 
as droughts or floods) occurred, how the shocks would be mitigated?” Pre-coded answers include 1). Farmers mitigate 
on their own; 2). Farmers cooperate to mitigate; 3). Village leaders/collective mitigate; 4). Township, county or other 
local or upper level governments mitigate; 4). Other (Please explain).   
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Another social norm relevant for irrigation investment and specific to rural China regards 
who should pay for irrigation investment. Village leaders used to make investment decisions and 
finance irrigation projects with funds from collective coffers of local revenues. Bouma, van Soest, 
and Bulte (2007) show that a village maintenance fund discouraged private individuals to 
undertake investments in common pool resources in India. China’s fiscal reforms intended to 
change the funding norm to be a public-private partnership where farmers voluntarily contribute 
to irrigation investment. We use a social support variable to gauge whether this new norm is widely 
accepted by farmers. The social support variable indicates financial support would be available 
from other villagers (as opposed to village leaders or upper level government) when a villager had 
no access to irrigation water for a whole year.3 A similar social support variable is also used in 
Willy and Holm-Müller (2013) as a component of social capital. 
It should be noted that although we have reported social capital measures by networks, 
trust and norms, there is no clear-cut distinction between these three dimensions. For example, 
previous studies have used trust and norms interchangeably (e.g., Beekman and Butle 2012). 
Factor analysis with the method of principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to discover 
patterns among all social capital measures we have constructed (Appendix 1). Results of factor 
analysis indicate that most social capital measures are largely consistent with the underlying 
construct they are intended for. For example, both social capital measures constructed using 
answers to the two trust questions have high factor loadings on Factor 1, which is consistent with 
our intention to use both measures as social trust. Both adjusted number of non-water associations 
                                                          
3 Factor analysis with the method of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is applied to a set of dummy variables 
constructed using answers to the survey question is “If your neighbor had no access to irrigation for a whole year, who 
do you think would help him or her financially? Please list the three most likely sources.” Pre-coded answers include 
1). nobody; 2). relatives; 3). neighbors; 4). friends; 5). village leaders; 6). county or township government; 7). 
irrigation district; 8). other administrative units; 9). other (please explain). Since only a few respondents listed options 
6-8, we combine them with option 5. One factor is retained since it has an eigenvalue greater than one. 
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and governance quality have high factor loadings on Factor 2, which is consistent with our 
intention to use both measures as index for broad social network. Both variables used to measure 
the norms of cooperation load onto the same factor (Factor 6). Overlaps between different 
dimensions also exist. For example, the two variables we use to measure social support and group 
under norms (relatives or friends help financially and neighbors help financially) load onto the 
same factor (Factor 4) as the variable we use to measure close networks (number of relatives or 
friends). The variables we use to measure norms of social support, monitoring, and conflict 
resolutions load onto the same factor (Factor 5). Part of the reason may be because these three 
variables all measure whether village leaders are still the key actors in irrigation-related matters. 
The first two variables (village leaders help financially and village leaders resolve water allocation 
conflicts) directly characterize village leaders’ roles. The third variable also indirectly depict 
village leaders’ role. Answers to the follow-up question “If you would report rule-breaking 
behavior, who you would report to?” indicate that village leaders are the most cited persons of 
contact. In the empirical analysis, the social capital measures we constructed, instead of factors, 
are used since their coefficients are easier to interpret. In addition, we are also interested in 
investigating whether different measures of the same underlying factor (e.g., trust in village leaders 
versus trust in villagers, non-water associations versus governance quality) have different 
predictive powers. 
4 Empirical strategies 
The first part of this section models individual farmers’ decisions to contribute to surface 
water irrigation projects and choices between labor and cash contribution. The second part 
analyzes the aggregate level of contributions made by farmers at the village level. Only cash 
contribution is analyzed in this part due to the lack of data on aggregate labor contributions. Given 
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that so far only 14% of cash investment in village level irrigation infrastructure come from farmers 
in rural China (Boyle, Huang, and Wang 2014), the focus on cash investment can generate 
important insights for improving local irrigation systems in rural China. 
4.1 Individual level regression 
We first model individual farmers’ decisions regarding contribution to village level surface 
water irrigation projects as a two-step process. A farmer first decides whether to contribute. 
Conditional on the decision to contribute, the farmer then chooses between two forms of 
contributions: labor or cash. In our sample, labor contribution is the dominant format. More than 
half of the sample farmers (53%) contributed only labor to surface water irrigation projects in 2011 
(Table 1). A much smaller share of farmers (10%) contributed only cash. An even smaller share 
of farmers (only 5%) contributed both cash and labor. To simplify the analysis, these farmers are 
categorized as those that contributed cash. 
A sequential logistic model can be used for such two-step decision-making processes 
(Amemiya 1981; Kahn and Morimune 1979). In the first step, the utility farmer i in village j gains 
from contribution to surface water irrigation projects, yij1*, is related to a set of factors as: 
yij1* = sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1 + εij1 (2) 
The vector sij contains the social capital variables that are of key interest in this study. The vectors 
hij and vj contain household and village characteristics. Instead of yij1*, we only observe the binary 
variable, yij1, which equals 1 if the farmer decides to contribute: 
yij1 = { 1 if  yij1
* > 0 
(3) 
0 if  otherwise  
Assuming the error term εij1 follows a logistic distribution, 
 Pr(yij1 = 1) = Pr(εij1 > – (sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1)) 
(4) 
                   = 
exp(sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1) 
 
1 + exp(sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1) 
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In the second step, the farmer chooses between cash or labor contributions. We observe the 
second binary variable, yij2, which equals 1 for cash contribution. With the assumption of a logistic 
distribution, 
 Pr(yij2 = 1) = Pr(εij2 > – (sijβ2 + hijδ2 + vjγ2)) 
(5) 
                   = 
exp(sijβ2 + hijδ2 + vjγ2) 
 
1 + exp(sijβ2 + hijδ2 + vjγ2) 
In the data, the contribution decision of a farmer is represented by a categorical variable, 
Yij, which is coded to be 1 for no contribution, 2 for labor contribution and 3 for cash contribution. 
The probabilities can be expressed as: 
 
 Pr(Yij = 1) = Pr(yij1 = 0) 
(6) 
                 = 
1 
 
1 + exp(sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1) 
 
 Pr(Yij = 2) = Pr(yij1 = 1) × Pr(yij2 = 0) 
(7) 
                 = 
exp(sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1) 
× 
1 
 
1 + exp(sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1) 1 + exp(sijβ2 + hijδ2 + vjγ2) 
 
 Pr(Yij = 3) = Pr(yij1 = 1) × Pr(yij2 = 1) 
(8) 
                 = 
exp(sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1) 
× 
exp(sijβ2 + hijδ2 + vjγ2) 
 
1 + exp(sijβ1 + hijδ1 + vjγ1) 1 + exp(sijβ2 + hijδ2 + vjγ2) 
 
The parameters, β1, β2, δ1, δ2, γ1, γ2, can then be estimated by maximizing the following 
log-likelihood function: 
ln L = ∑ij lnPr(Yij= m)
I(Yij = m)       m = 1, 2, 3.                                (9) 
where I(∙) is an indicator function. 
Several potential issues may lead to biased estimates of the coefficients of social capital 
variables. Bias may arise from the omission of factors that can influence the dependent variable 
and are also correlated with existing explanatory variables. The likelihood of omitted variable bias 
is minimized in our empirical analysis by the inclusion of a large set of variables in the vectors hij 
and vj to control for likely confounding factors. The choices of the explanatory variables are based 
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on the literature on collective action in resource management (e.g., Meinzen-Dick 2007; Araral 
2009) as well as the literature on public good provision in rural China (e.g., Wei, Ling, and Ruan 
2011; Cai, Zhu, and Chen 2016). The first set of variables measures the demographic 
characteristics of households including age, education, household size and gender. Of particular 
interest is the share of female household members, which may affect both the decision to contribute 
through gender differences in social preferences and the choices between labor and cash 
contribution possibly due to gender differences in physical labor. 
The second set of variable measures household socioeconomic characteristics including 
total household asset and the degree to which household members were engaged in off-farm work. 
Farmers’ access to off-farm employment might affect their decisions to contribute because it 
provides farmers an exit option from collective action (Wang, Chen, and Araral 2016); In addition, 
by changing the opportunity cost of time, off-farm employment may also influence the choice 
between labor and cash contributions. A greater dependence on a resource creates incentives for 
cooperation (e.g., Araral 2009; Meinzen-Dick 2007). Since rice is one of the most water intensive 
among all major crops in our sample areas, the share of land allocated to rice production is used to 
gauge the salience of irrigation to farmers’ livelihoods, which can influence their incentives to 
contribute to irrigation projects. The last household level variable, average land per capita, 
measures household land endowment. 
The conditions of village irrigation systems are the most important determinant of the needs 
for irrigation investment and are likely to influence farmers’ decision to contribute. These include 
the share of total canal length in village that was lined, the share of canal command area that was 
actually irrigated, and a dummy variable indicating canals in village silted up easily. 
Characteristics of users also matter (e.g., Araral 2009; Meinzen-Dick 2007). Number of 
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households per meter of canal is used. The last village level variable, the distance from a village 
to township government, measures the remoteness of the village. In addition to guard again omitted 
variable bias, the inclusion of these factors also allows us to examine the effects of social capital 
variables while controlling for the context in which these effects take place. In an alternative 
specification, a set of county dummies is also added (county fixed effects model) to control for 
any unobserved heterogeneity at the county level. 
Another possible source of bias is measurement errors, which could shrink the magnitudes 
of the coefficients of mis-measured explanatory variables toward zero. Some social capital 
variables, such as the number of relatives or friends available for financial support, are not likely 
to be mis-measured since farmers do not have incentives to over- or under-report. For most social 
capital variables constructed using information in the village questionnaire, we are able to check 
their consistency with information reported by canal managers. Other variables, such as trust 
variables and whether a farmer would report rule-breaking behavior, may be more of a problem 
due to respondents’ tendency to be compliant with “socially preferred answers”. Two strategies 
are used to address potential measurement errors. First, during the survey, enumerators emphasized 
that our research team was not affiliated with any government agency that could regulate farmers 
and that their identities and answers would never be revealed. In addition, farmers were told that 
there was no correct or wrong answer to any of the social capital questions. Second, in an 
alternative specification, we check the robustness of results by replacing social capital variables 
with factors extracted from factor analysis with the method of PCA. The results are largely 
consistent between social capital variables and corresponding factors that tend to measure the same 
underlying construct. 
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A third possible source of bias is reverse causality, which occurs if farmers’ contribution 
to irrigation projects (the dependent variable) could influence the accumulation of social capital 
(explanatory variables). Some social capital variables, such as number of relatives and friends and 
number of non-water associations, are not likely to suffer from reverse causality. However, the 
experience of working together on building new canals (e.g., through labor contribution to 
irrigation projects) may affect a farmer’s trust in other villagers or their inclination to work 
cooperatively with others to mitigate weather shocks. To address the potential endogeneity of some 
social capital variables, instrumental variable (IV) estimation is used. To reduce the number of IVs 
needed, we use a specification that only includes social capital variables with statistically 
significant coefficients and thus only instrument for these variables. Six social capital variables 
are retained in the reduced model: strongly agree or agree that villagers can be trusted, strongly 
agree village leaders can be trusted, governance quality, villagers support financially when no 
irrigation and villagers cooperate to mitigate extreme weather shocks. 
Six IVs are used. The first three variables attempt to measure the degree of heterogeneity 
in a village. Previous studies have found that social capital is more difficult to form in 
heterogeneous communities. For example, trust level tends to be lower in more ethnically 
heterogeneous communities (e.g., Bahry et al. 2005). In most rural areas in China including our 
sample area, not much ethnical difference is observed. Instead, households identify more with their 
last names since households sharing the last time are likely to be related. Therefore two variables 
are used to measure the diversity of last name in a village: a last name diversity index in the village4 
and a dummy variable indicating a farmer has the most common last name in the village (shared 
                                                          
4 The last name diversity index in the village is calculated using the same measure as in Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 
(1999): Ij  = 1 – Σr(sjr)2, where sjr is the share of households with last name r in village j. The index takes a value 
between zero (perfectly homogeneous) and one. 
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by most households). A third variable, the number of villages merged to form the current village, 
is likely to be correlated with the degree of heterogeneity in a village as well. The merge of villages 
is a policy used by Chinese government since the 2000s in order to increase land use efficiency 
(Ong 2014). The next two variables, number of years a village has been formed and number of 
people per unit of land, may also influence the level of social capital. In villages with longer 
histories, trust levels may be high since farmers have known each other for a longer time. 
Cooperation and/or governance may be more difficult in villages with higher population density 
due to the difficulty of coordinating among more people. The last variable, past experience with 
natural disasters, may shape farmers’ opinion of the benefits of cooperation as well as other 
villagers’ trustworthiness. It may also increase the likelihood of farmers participating in social 
networks as insurance against future shocks. 
Since it is difficult to operate IV estimation in nonlinear models with multiple endogenous 
variables such as the sequential logit model, two linear models are used to estimate the decision to 
contribute and the choice between cash and labor contributions separately. The use of linear 
models also allows us to add a set of county dummies (county fixed effects model). However, the 
model on farmers’ choices between cash and labor contributions may suffer from sample selection 
bias since only farmers who contributed are included in the analysis. To correct for such sample 
selection bias, we follow the commonly used Heckman’s two-step procedure (Heckman 1979) and 
include a selection correction term as an additional explanatory variable. The selection correction 
term, Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), is computed using the estimation results of a probit model on the 
decision to contribute using the whole sample. The percent of land for rice production is used to 
identify the selection correction term and so is excluded from the regression on the choice between 
cash and labor contributions. Famers growing more rice is more likely to contribute since irrigation 
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is essential to rice production. However, the share of land allocated to rice is not likely to have a 
strong correlation with the form of contribution farmers make. 
4.2 Village level regression 
The second part of the analysis examines the impact of social capital on the aggregate 
contributions made by farmers in the village. In particular, two outcomes, denoted by Hjk, are used: 
the share of total village level investment in surface water irrigation projects contributed by farmers 
and the share of maintenance expenditure from farmers. 
Hjk  = αk + cjθk + wjηk + ωjk (10) 
Equation (10) is estimated for each of the two outcomes, index by k. The vector cj contains 
the key variables of interest: social capital variables measured at the village level. For variables 
that measure individuals’ social capital and constructed using information in the household 
questionnaire, the village average is used. Other variables, such as governance quality and adjusted 
number of non-water associations, measure village level social capital and are constructed using 
information from village leader questionnaire. These variables are included as is. The vector wj 
contains three sets of village level variables, some of which are also used in individual level 
regressions. The first set measures conditions of local irrigation systems: share of total canal length 
in village that was lined, share of canal command area that was actually irrigated and a dummy 
variable indicating canals in village silted up easily. The second set of variables measure the 
characteristics of users of irrigation systems: number of households per meter of canal, share of 
villagers with junior high or above education, average income per capita and share of village labor 
force that worked off-farm. The third set includes two variables that measure other village 
characteristics: per capita land holding and distance from village center to township government. 
A set of county dummies is also added to capture any unobserved heterogeneity at the county level. 
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5 Results 
In this section, we outline our main results linking social capital and farmers’ investments 
in surface water irrigation projects. We first examine how social capital influences farmers’ 
decisions to contribute to surface water irrigation projects at individual level. Then we investigate 
the relationship between social capital and the share of money to build or maintain surface water 
irrigation infrastructure from farmers at the village level. 
In column 1 and column 2 of Table 2, the average marginal effects of the sequential logit 
model that estimates the joint probabilities of farmers’ two decisions (whether to contribute to 
surface water irrigation projects and whether to make cash contributions or labor contributions) 
are reported. Some control variables show significant impacts on farmers’ decisions. Variables 
indicating the percent of the irrigated area in the village and the number of household per meter of 
canal are positively correlated with farmers’ decisions to contribute, implying that when farmers 
rely more on irrigation for crop production and share canals with more farmers (the amount of 
canals is in shortage), they have more incentives to participate in surface water irrigation projects 
to improve the current local irrigation systems. The variables indicating that the canals in village 
silt up easily and the distance of the village to the township government is further are positively 
correlated with farmers’ decisions to contribute. The variable indicating household size is 
positively correlated with farmers’ decisions to make cash contributions, indicating farmers with 
a large household size are more likely to make cash contributions. 
Among social capital variables, two social norm variables of cooperation have statistically 
significant and positive impacts on farmers’ decisions to contribute. In the village where farmers 
have a social norm to cooperate, indicated by villagers support each other financially when no 
irrigation and villagers cooperate to mitigate extreme weather shocks, farmers are more likely to 
make contributions. Social norms of cooperation create an altruistic characteristic among farmers. 
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Farmers have more community-oriented concerns (how can our neighborhood be improved) 
instead of self-oriented interests (how can I get richer). Hence, they are more likely to make 
contributions to surface water irrigation projects to increase the welfare of all villagers (Suebvises 
2018). 
Higher governance quality also appears to be a primary motivation for farmers to make 
contributions to village irrigation projects. It suggests that in villages with a higher quality 
governance of local irrigation systems, more information about local canals is shared among 
villagers. Thus, farmers are more aware of the needs for local irrigation systems, have a stronger 
sense of ownership of the local canals, and have a higher probability to contribute to surface water 
irrigation projects. 
However, social network variables, the number of friends or relatives who provide help to 
a farmer and having more high-quality non-water-related associations in the village, do not affect 
farmers’ decisions to contribute. It suggests that in these two types of social networks, farmers 
may not exchange information about irrigation practices, and thus they do not gain motivations to 
contribute to surface water irrigation projects. 
In terms of the choice between labor and cash contributions, two variables indicating that 
farmers’ trust fellow villagers have significant and positive effects on their decisions to contribute 
cash. Since farmers’ cash contribution level is not revealed to each other, farmers’ decisions to 
make cash contributions are highly dependent on the degree to which they trust other villagers 
would contribute a similar amount of cash. Farmers with a higher level of trust in fellow villagers 
would believe that other villagers would reciprocate their contribution of cash (via making 
reciprocal cash contribution), and thus are more likely to contribute cash. In contrast, farmers with 
a lower level of trust in fellow villages are more likely to make labor contributions because farmers 
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make labor contributions by participating in a temporary task team to build new irrigation 
infrastructure. It ensures farmers can easily monitor each other and make a similar amount of labor 
contributions. 
Governance quality and social networks do not show significant impacts on farmers’ 
choices between labor and cash contributions. It indicates that farmers consider the outcomes of 
labor and cash contributions have no difference in terms of improving local irrigation systems. 
Although farmers can be better informed about the needs of local irrigation systems with a high-
quality governance and more social networks, they tend to be indifferent between making cash 
contributions and labor contributions. This is also supported by the evidence that farmers’ choices 
between labor and cash contributions are not influenced by any variable indicating the condition 
of local canals because farmers consider both forms of contributions can improve the efficiency of 
water delivery in local irrigation canals. 
In addition, the alternative specification, in which we only include statistically significant 
social capital variables from the previous results and other control variables, is also run (Column 
3 and 4 of Table 2). This does not change any of the results. Governance quality of canals and the 
norm that villagers support each other financially when no irrigation have significant and positive 
impacts on farmers’ decisions to contribute, while the degree to which farmers trust fellow 
villagers and village leaders has a statically significant influence on farmers’ choices between cash 
and labor contributions. 
To check the robustness of the results, a county fixed effects with correction for sample-
selection model is also run (column 1 and 2 of Table 3). Here, we treat the dependent variables 
indicating whether to contribute to surface water irrigation projects and whether to make cash 
contributions as continuous variables. The county fixed effects are added to both regressions to 
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capture unobservable effects at the county level. Inverse Mills Ratios (calculated from the first 
step of regression of contribution) are added to the second-step of the regression to correct for 
sample selection bias. Results are comparable with the sequential logit model. 
To probe into the issue of reverse causality, we process with two models with instrumental 
variables (column 3 and 4 of Table 3). Unfortunately, attempts to instrument all social capital 
variables at the same time again lead to a weak instruments problem. We adopt the method of 
Andrews, Moreira, and Stock (2006) to adjust the standard errors so that significance tests have 
the correct size in the presence of weak instruments. We are limited to including one endogenous 
regressor at a time. All of the IV results thus should be interpreted cautiously. In fact, even when 
each of the social capital variables is the only endogenous variable in the regression, the estimated 
impacts are always statistically insignificant. Hence, we are unable to verify whether our earlier 
results for social capital stand up to closer scrutiny in an IV approach. In Appendix 2, the first 
stage results of IV approach are reported. It turns out that most of social capital variables tend to 
not be correlated with our instrumental variables, suggesting that social capital is hard to change. 
Social capital is built up slowly over a long time period of interactions with other villagers (e.g., 
Fukuyama 1995; Pretty and Ward 2001; Tu and Bulte 2010). 
Table 4 reports the results that using the county fixed effects model to estimate how social 
capital influences the share of cash to improve local irrigation systems contributed by farmers in 
village. Here, the dependent variables are the percent of investment to build new public surface 
water irrigation infrastructure from farmers and the percent of maintenance expenditure for 
irrigation systems from farmers in the village. Consistent with the individual level regressions, 
variables indicating farmers trust fellow villagers show significant and positive signs in the 
equation of the percent of investment from farmers. When trust among villagers is well established, 
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the need for costly monitoring and enforcement is eliminated since farmers expect others to act in 
accordance with the shared norms. Thus, more share of cash is contributed by farmers to build new 
surface water irrigation infrastructure in the village. At the same time, variables indicating farmers 
trust village leaders show significant and negative signs in the equation of the percent of 
maintenance expenditure from farmers, suggesting that when farmers trust village leaders 
contribute more to maintain irrigation infrastructure, the less share of maintenance expenditure 
will be contributed by farmers in the village. The number of relatives or friends for financial 
support show a positive and significant impact on the percent of maintenance expenditure from 
framers, suggesting that in villages that have dense social networks, more share of maintenance 
expenditure is contributed from farmers. 
6 Conclusions 
Using data from China Water Institution and Management (CWIM) survey, the study first 
constructs measures of all three most studied dimensions of social capital: trust, networks, and 
norms. The study then examines if social capital has any predictive powers of individual farmers’ 
contribution decisions as well as farmers’ contributions aggregated at the village level. Farmers’ 
choices between different forms of contributions (labor versus cash) are also analyzed. In line with 
the literature on social capital, our empirical results from the different models suggest that few 
social capital variables do seem to influence farmers’ investment in surface water irrigation 
projects. It has important implications for managing village irrigation projects, particularly in the 
context of developing countries embarking on decentralization reforms. In the decentralized 
irrigation governance structures, increasing farmers’ contribution to surface water irrigation 
projects is a crucial means to improve the conditions of local irrigation systems. Rather than 
increasing farmers’ contributions to village irrigation projects by providing them tangible 
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incentives, such as subsidizing their contributions, local irrigation system managers should also 
pay attention to intangible motivations for collective action. For example, the relationship between 
local irrigation system managers and farmers is an important factor in determining the success of 
irrigation-related collective action. In the case of China, instead of encouraging villages to build 
WUAs to manage canals, the government should also need to find out how to improve the quality 
of governance of local irrigation canals. A stronger feeling of ownership, brought by high-quality 
governance of local irrigation canals, can effectively influence farmers’ participation in collective 
surface water irrigation projects (Fontana and Grugel 2016). 
In addition, a social norm of cooperation also encourages farmers to contribute to surface 
water irrigation projects. The social norm of cooperation provides farmers with strong incentives 
to cooperate to resolve issues, and thus increases farmers’ contributions to surface water irrigation 
projects. One of the effective policies to help the community to gain a norm of cooperation is 
building voluntary organizations in the village. It teaches empathy, the art of compromise and 
cooperation, creates the peer pressure of helping each other, and thus encourages the formalization 
of the social norm of cooperation in the village (Newton 2001). Therefore, village leaders should 
also focus on building new voluntary associations in addition to operating the current associations 
in the village. 
Last but not least, in terms of the choice between different types of contributions to surface 
water irrigation projects, the degree to which farmers trust other villagers turns out to be one of 
the most vital factors influencing the decision. When farmers have more trust in fellow villagers, 
they tend to make cash contributions instead of labor contributions. It indicates that local irrigation 
system managers should recognize the social environment rather than analyzing summary 
demographic information alone when encouraging farmers to contribute to surface water irrigation 
31 
projects. The success of collective action is highly correlated with local context. For villages that 
have a high degree of trust among villagers, local surface water irrigation managers should target 
in improving farmers’ cash contributions, otherwise, encouraging farmers to contribute labor is a 
more practical goal. 
There are limitations to our study. Some social capital measures could be improved. For 
example, in future surveys, we could use trust questions from Tu et al. (2011) that asked 
respondents to rate how much they trust various groups with a scale from 0 to 10.  IV estimation 
suffers from weak IV problem. Future data collection efforts that generate data sets of a larger 
sample size and panel in nature may enable analysis that looks into the causal effects of social 
capital variables. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Variable descriptions and summary statistics 
Variable name Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables      
Contributed Dummy variable, =1 if a farmer contributed to building surface 
water irrigation infrastructure in 2011 
0.68 0.47 0 1 
Contributed only labor Dummy variable,  =1 if a farmer contributed labor to building 
surface water irrigation infrastructure in 2011 
0.53 0.50 0 1 
Contributed cash a Dummy variable,  =1 if a farmer contributed cash to building 
surface water irrigation infrastructure in 2011 
0.15 0.36 0 1 
% investment from farmers ¶ b The share of total investment in building surface water irrigation 
infrastructure contributed by farmers during 2005-2015 
0.15 0.30 0 1 
% maintenance expenditure from 
farmers ¶ 
The share of irrigation system maintenance expenditure 
contributed by farmers during 2005-2015 
0.39 0.44 0 1 
Social capital variables  
    
Strongly agree villagers can be trusted Dummy variable indicating a farmer strongly agrees that most 
villagers can be trusted 
0.19 0.39 0 1 
Agree villagers can be trusted Dummy variable indicating a farmer agrees that most villagers 
can be trusted 
0.77 0.42 0 1 
Strongly agree village leaders can be 
trusted 
Dummy variable indicating a farmer strongly agrees that village 
leaders can be trusted 
0.13 0.34 0 1 
Agree village leaders can be trusted Dummy variable indicating a farmer agrees that village leaders 
can be trusted 
0.71 0.45 0 1 
N relatives or friends for financial 
support 
Number of relatives or friends that can provide support when a 
farmer has financial difficulties 
10.49 14.41 0 110 
Adjusted N non-water associations ¶ Number of non-water associations in the village, adjusted by 
years of existence, participation rate, and frequency of activities 
2.24 1.86 0 8.38 
Governance quality ¶ Quality of local irrigation systems governance 0.54 0.21 0 0.85 
N O&M tasks managed by farmers ¶ Number of canal operation and maintenance tasks managed by 
farmers 
0.41 0.80 0 3 
If your neighbors did not have access to irrigation water for a whole year, who would help them 
financially?  
    
Relatives or friends Dummy variable, =1 if a farmer listed relatives or friends 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Neighbors Dummy variable, =1 if a farmer listed neighbors 0.35 0.48 0 1 
  
3
8 
Variable name Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Village leaders or upper level 
government 
Dummy variable, =1 if a farmer listed village leaders or upper 
level government 
0.43 0.50 0 1 
Village leaders resolve water allocation 
conflicts  
Dummy variable, =1 if village leaders resolve water allocation 
conflicts 
0.31 0.46 0 1 
Report rule-breaking behavior Dummy variable, =1 if a farmer would report rule-breaking 
water use behavior if it were observed 
0.50 0.50 0 1 
Villagers mitigate extreme weather 
shocks on their own 
Dummy variable 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Villagers cooperate to mitigate extreme 
weather shocks 
Dummy variable 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Household characteristics (N=189)      
Age Age of household head in 2007 49.03 10.83 15 72 
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head in 2007 6.51 3.23 0 12 
Household size Number of household members in 2007 3.84 1.59 1 9 
% female The share of household members that are female in 2007 0.48 0.15 0 1 
Total HH asset (100,000 yuan) Total household asset in 100,000 yuan in 2007 0.17 0.25 0.01 2.28 
% off-farm  Average share of household members that worked off-farm 
during 2004-2010 (adjusted by percent of labor time allocated to 
off-farm activities) 0.10 0.15 0 0.71 
% rice Share of land allocated to rice production in 2007 0.21 0.33 0 1 
HH per capita land holding (mu) Average land per capita in the household in mu in 2007 3.07 2.35 0.27 13 
Farmer has the most common last name Dummy variable, =1 if a household has a last name shared by 
the most households in the village 
0.36 0.48 0 1 
Experienced disasters between 2001 
and 2007 
Dummy variable, =1 if a household experienced natural 
disasters such as pests and wind, between 2001 and 2007 
0.65 0.48 0 1 
 Village characteristics (N=52) a  
    
Village per capita land holding (mu) ¶ Average land per capita in village in 2007 2.09 1.40 0.48 7.20 
% lined canal in village ¶ Share of total canal length in village that was lined in 2007 0.32 0.42 0 1 
% irrigated area in village ¶ Share of canal command area that was actually irrigated in 
village in 2007 
0.93 0.13 0.44 1 
Canals in village silt up easily ¶ Dummy variable, =1 if canals in village silted up easily in 2007 0.77 0.43 0 1 
N HH per meter of canal, log and 
standardized ¶ 
Number of households per meter of canal in 2007, log and 
standardized 
0 1 -2.68 1.45 
% villagers with junior high or above 
education ¶ 
Share of villagers with junior high or above education in 2007 
0.57 0.23 0.10 0.95 
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Variable name Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Income per capita in village (100,000 
yuan)¶ 
Average income per capita in the village in 2007 
0.033 0.021 0.0090 16. 
% off-farm in village ¶ Share of village labor force that worked off-farm in 2007 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.53 
Distance to township government (km) 
¶ 
Distance from village center to township government in km 4.38 3.67 0 15 
Last name diversity index in village ¶  1.50 0.28 1.02 2.33 
N villages merged ¶ Number of villages merged into the current village  2.10 2.66 1 14 
Number of years a village has been 
formed ¶  
43.92 26.31 4 62 
N people per mu ¶ Number of people per unit of land 0.71 0.49 0.15 2.38 
Notes: ¶ These variables are constructed from questionnaires that collect village-level information.  
a In total 52 villages are included. Since not every village had irrigation infrastructure projects, only 50 villages are included in 
the investment regressions. 
.
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Table 2. Individual-level regressions using sequential logit model, Average marginal effects (AME) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Contributed 
a  Contributed cash b  Contributed b  Contributed cash b 
Strongly agree villagers can be trusted 0.106 (0.213)  2.286*** (0.307)  -0.00244 (0.205)  2.553*** (0.313) 
Agree villagers can be trusted -0.0146 (0.201)  2.308*** (0.313)  -0.0959 (0.188)  2.532*** (0.326) 
Strongly agree village leaders can be trusted -0.251* (0.137)  -0.265 (0.183)  -0.169 (0.109)  -0.318** (0.159) 
Agree village leaders can be trusted -0.114 (0.0919)  0.00364 (0.115)  
  
 
  
N relatives or friends for financial support 
0.00294 (0.00210)  0.00109 (0.00199)  
  
 
  
Adjusted N non-water associations 
0.0161 (0.0237)  0.0127 (0.0215)  
  
 
  
Governance quality 
0.343** (0.166)  -0.195 (0.246)  0.352** (0.163)  -0.181 (0.235) 
N canal O&M tasks managed by villagers 
0.0435 (0.0399)  -0.00604 (0.0527)  
  
 
  
Villagers support financially when no irrigation 
0.0636** (0.0319)  0.0327 (0.0405)  0.0540* (0.0317)  0.0159 (0.0357) 
Village leaders resolve water allocation conflicts 
0.0301 (0.0662)  0.0430 (0.0853)  
  
 
  
Report rule-breaking behavior 
-0.0510 (0.0663)  0.0796 (0.0751)  
  
 
  
Villagers mitigate extreme weather shocks on their own 
0.0512 (0.0701)  0.0827 (0.0835)  
  
 
  
Villagers cooperate to mitigate extreme weather shocks 
0.158* (0.0855)  -0.0790 (0.102)  0.125 (0.0790)  -0.119 (0.0943) 
Age  
-0.00352 (0.00346)  0.00247 (0.00427)  -0.00497 (0.00317)  0.00206 (0.00385) 
Years of schooling  
-0.0102 (0.0132)  -0.00642 (0.0155)  -0.00940 (0.0127)  -0.00378 (0.0142) 
Household size  
0.0236 (0.0260)  0.0455* (0.0250)  0.0166 (0.0253)  0.0455* (0.0256) 
% female  
0.131 (0.194)  -0.209 (0.248)  0.0767 (0.194)  -0.136 (0.242) 
Total HH asset (100000 yuan) 
0.385 (0.257)  0.106 (0.109)  0.439 (0.291)  0.121 (0.102) 
% off-farm 
-0.0704 (0.237)  -0.0299 (0.264)  -0.110 (0.226)  0.00547 (0.264) 
% rice  
0.0285 (0.109)  -0.0776 (0.145)  0.0636 (0.108)  -0.109 (0.138) 
HH per capita land holding in mu  
0.00342 (0.0182)  0.0149 (0.0214)  0.00159 (0.0189)  0.0196 (0.0208) 
% lined canal in village 
0.0587 (0.0981)  0.100 (0.122)  0.0606 (0.0928)  0.0746 (0.106) 
% irrigated area in village 
0.611* (0.318)  -0.451 (0.573)  0.635** (0.274)  -0.590 (0.534) 
Canals in village silt up easily 
0.166* (0.0916)  0.0316 (0.108)  0.144* (0.0818)  -0.0283 (0.104) 
N HH per meter of canal, log and standardized 
0.0870** (0.0428)  0.0139 (0.0521)  0.0746* (0.0439)  -0.00181 (0.0510) 
Distance to township government in km 
0.0252*** (0.00917)  -0.0134 (0.0101)  0.0260*** (0.00939)  -0.0153 (0.00963) 
Observations 189  
 189  
 189  
 189  
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.       a Base outcome: Did not contribute in 2011.      b Base outcome: Contributed labor in 2011.
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Table 3. Individual-level regressions, Reduced model with county fixed effects 
 County fixed effects model  2SLS model c 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Contributed a Contributed 
cash b 
 
Contributed a Contributed 
cash b 
Strongly agree villagers can be trusted c  -0.00625 0.205*  -2.129 0.294 
  (0.237) (0.105)  (6.032) (1.222) 
Agree villagers can be trusted c  0.00507 0.188**  -1.698 -0.291 
  (0.165) (0.0843)  (8.188) (2.684) 
Strongly agree village leaders can be trusted c  -0.0267 -0.281**  2.764 -1.370  
(0.0630) (0.121)  (8.497) (1.122) 
Governance quality c 0.0727** -0.224  1.477 -1.073 
  (0.0262) (0.315)  (2.988) (1.198) 
Villagers support financially when no irrigation c 0.427* 0.0227  0.858 -0.231 
(0.237) (0.0409)  (6.260) (0.319) 
Villagers cooperate to mitigate extreme weather 
shocks c 
0.0704 -0.147  0.497 -0.892 
(0.0635) (0.111)  (2.450) (0.882) 
Age -0.00275 0.000960  -0.0121 0.0158 
  (0.00293) (0.00661)  (0.0406) (0.0154) 
Years of schooling -0.0131 -0.00840  -0.157 0.0846 
  (0.00870) (0.0149)  (0.392) (0.0618) 
Household size 0.0213 0.0207  0.208 -0.0684 
  (0.0222) (0.0424)  (0.352) (0.0871) 
% female -0.00994 -0.221  -1.616 0.264 
  (0.215) (0.326)  (6.096) (0.588) 
Total HH asset (100,000 yuan) 0.251*** 0.103  0.515 -0.629 
  (0.0298) (0.144)  (1.545) (0.438) 
% off-farm -0.0995 -0.0210  0.0509 0.429 
  (0.208) (0.222)  (1.986) (0.555) 
% rice 0.0250   -0.0449  
  (0.0863)   (1.904)  
HH per capita land holding (mu) 0.00468 -0.00174  0.00692 0.00513 
(0.0171) (0.0314)  (0.126) (0.0468) 
% lined canal in village 0.321** 0.177  1.100 -0.478 
  (0.114) (0.187)  (3.289) (0.345) 
% irrigated area in village 0.666* -0.0693  0.175 -0.520 
  (0.346) (1.912)  (5.671) (1.569) 
Canals in village silt up easily  0.170** -0.0786  0.358 -0.546* 
(0.0632) (0.121)  (1.476) (0.307) 
N HH per meter of canal, log and standardized  0.145*** 0.0261  0.285 -0.288 
(0.0291) (0.102)  (0.704) (0.205) 
Distance to township government (km)  0.0199 -0.0437*  0.0342 -0.0977*** 
(0.0152) (0.0224)  (0.0608) (0.0359) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.0730   -1.574** 
   (0.360)   (0.780) 
Constant -0.418 0.573  2.252 2.732 
  (0.383) (2.337)  (6.603) (2.417) 
Observations 189 129  189 129 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.*, **, *** indicate levels of statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
a Base outcome: Did not contribute in 2011. 
b Base outcome: Contributed labor in 2011. 
c. These variables are used as instruments for potentially endogenous variables (strongly 
trust in village leaders, strong trust in villagers, trust in villagers, villagers support 
financially when no irrigation, villagers cooperate to mitigate extreme weather shocks 
governance quality): The number of years that village is founded. Last name diversity 
index in village, N people per mu, N nature villages merged, have largest last name, and 
experienced disasters between 2001 and 2007. 
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Table 4. Village level regressions, County fixed effects model 
 (1) 
 (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
% investment from 
farmers 
 % maintenance 
expenditure from 
farmers 
 % investment from 
farmers 
 % maintenance 
expenditure from 
farmers 
Strongly agree villagers can be trusted 1.551* (0.715)  0.220 (0.633)  1.520* (0.795)  0.240 (0.645) 
Agree villagers can be trusted 1.422** (0.612)  -0.670 (0.594)  1.466** (0.659)  -0.614 (0.641) 
Strongly agree village leaders can be trusted 0.517 (0.625)  -1.348* (0.626)  0.411 (0.533)  -1.357** (0.528) 
Agree village leaders can be trusted 0.226 (0.348)  -0.557** (0.219)  0.239 (0.264)  -0.554*** (0.159) 
N relatives or friends for financial support -0.00865 (0.00559)  0.0131** (0.00513)  -0.0108 (0.00646)  0.0132** (0.00478) 
Adjusted N non-water associations 0.0157 (0.0259)  0.00404 (0.0232)  
  
 
  
Governance quality -0.0732 (0.603)  0.394 (0.235)  -0.169 (0.520)  0.383 (0.236) 
N canal O&M tasks managed by villagers -0.0945** (0.0422)  -0.0288 (0.138)  -0.0368 (0.0418)  -0.0145 (0.121) 
Villagers support financially when no irrigation -0.0815 (0.131)  0.110 (0.172)  -0.101 (0.115)  0.110 (0.146) 
Village leaders resolve water allocation conflicts -0.207 (0.202)  -0.134 (0.164)  
  
 
  
Report rule-breaking behavior -0.117 (0.172)  0.0102 (0.162)  
  
 
  
Villagers mitigate extreme weather shocks on their 
own 
-0.385 (0.281)  -0.196 (0.162)  
  
 
  
Villagers cooperate to mitigate extreme weather 
shocks 
-0.549 (0.367)  -0.0812 (0.394)  -0.208 (0.283)  0.0724 (0.401) 
Village per capita land holding in mu 2007 -0.0388 (0.0523)  -0.137** (0.0607)  -0.0293 (0.0544)  -0.127* (0.0633) 
% lined canal in village 0.112 (0.201)  0.212 (0.195)  -0.0435 (0.147)  0.150 (0.213) 
% irrigated area in village 0.704 (0.821)  -1.114 (0.966)  0.771 (0.788)  -1.102 (0.825) 
Canals in village silt up easily 0.0112 (0.183)  -0.263** (0.111)  0.0353 (0.166)  -0.237** (0.0919) 
N HH per meter of canal, log and standardized  0.0449 (0.0401)  -0.121* (0.0652)  0.0485 (0.0414)  -0.108 (0.0645) 
% villagers with junior high or above education in 
2007 
0.265 (0.235)  0.236 (0.296)  0.326 (0.242)  0.274 (0.275) 
Income per capita(1000 yuan) in village 2007 -1.40 (3.38)  2.04 (3.46)  -1.60 (3.11)  1.99 (3.44) 
% off-farm in village 2007 -0.929 (0.570)  2.040*** (0.386)  -0.952 (0.564)  2.027*** (0.327) 
Distance to town government in km -0.0216 (0.0213)  -0.00400 (0.0258)  -0.00931 (0.0191)  0.00248 (0.0267) 
Constant -1.477 (1.103)  2.272 (1.498)  -1.892 (1.266)  2.009 (1.409) 
Observations 50 
 
 52 
 
 50 
 
 52 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. Factors loadings of social capital measures 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
Do you agree village leaders can be trusted?  0.8223 -0.0236 0.044 0.153 0.0065 0.1193 
Do you agree villagers can be trusted?  0.8489 -0.0665 -0.018 -0.0402 0.0988 -0.0351 
N relatives or friends for financial support -0.1042 -0.0725 0.3767 0.4844 0.5307 -0.2175 
Adjusted N non-water associations  -0.0218 0.7908 -0.1367 -0.0284 -0.0399 0.0607 
Governance quality -0.0525 0.8229 0.0915 0.1026 0.0224 -0.0612 
N O&M tasks managed by farmers  0.0196 -0.0327 0.931 -0.0766 -0.118 0.0455 
Relatives or friends help financially when no irrigation 0.0262 0.0886 -0.1165 0.728 0.0403 0.1217 
Neighbors help financially when no irrigation  0.0854 0.0165 0.0535 0.6778 -0.2222 0.2208 
Village leaders help financially when no irrigation 0.1065 0.2934 0.1246 -0.3849 0.4155 0.3484 
Village leaders resolve water allocation conflicts  0.0286 -0.0673 -0.138 -0.048 0.7594 0.0975 
Report rule-breaking behavior 0.4123 0.0788 -0.0716 -0.18 0.5216 -0.0564 
Villagers mitigate extreme weather shocks on their own (reverse coded) 0.0848 0.0741 0.0508 0.0612 0.1219 0.8607 
Villagers cooperate to mitigate extreme weather shocks -0.0318 -0.0777 -0.0354 0.2027 -0.0681 0.72 
  Notes: Bold figures are used to emphasize the variables that were highly correlated with extracted factors. 
*, **, *** indicate levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix 2. Individual-level regressions, reduced model 
First stage regression of 2SLS model 
 (1)  (1) (2) (5) (3) (4) 
 
Strongly 
trust in 
village 
leaders 
Strong 
trust in 
villagers 
Trust in 
villagers 
Governan
ce quality 
Villagers 
support 
financially 
when no 
irrigation 
Villagers 
cooperate 
to 
mitigate 
extreme 
weather 
shocks 
Last name diversity index in 
village  
0.460 -0.232 -0.203 0.147 1.468 -0.351 
(0.506) (0.575) (0.514) (0.157) (1.207) (0.540) 
Farmer has the most 
common last name 
-0.0485 0.0562 0.0188 -0.0273 -0.0515 0.121* 
(0.0624) (0.0681) (0.0544) (0.0228) (0.156) (0.0635) 
N villages merged -0.00721 0.0160 0.00300 -0.0313*** 0.0200 0.00460  
(0.0142) (0.0154) (0.0137) (0.00436) (0.0381) (0.0169) 
Number of years a village 
has been formed 
0.00220 -0.00271 0.00384** 0.000595 -0.00715 -0.00353* 
(0.00226) (0.00235) (0.00183) (0.000723) (0.00575) (0.00211) 
N people per mu 
  
-0.0363 0.0829 0.0682 -0.0794 -0.190 -0.0626 
(0.0994) (0.116) (0.0921) (0.0487) (0.310) (0.141) 
Experienced disasters  
between 2001 and 2007  
-0.123* 0.0670 -0.0562 0.00388 0.0248 0.0714 
(0.0684) (0.0740) (0.0540) (0.0228) (0.166) (0.0735) 
Age -0.00131 0.00202 -0.000692 0.00288** 0.00720 0.00126 
  (0.00288) (0.00327) (0.00258) (0.00111) (0.00708) (0.00345) 
Years of schooling -0.00887 0.0119 0.00831 0.00628 0.0811*** 0.0104 
  (0.0115) (0.0125) (0.00975) (0.00405) (0.0265) (0.0119) 
Household size -0.0331 0.0299 -0.0353 0.00498 -0.0808 -0.0325 
  (0.0228) (0.0270) (0.0213) (0.00861) (0.0534) (0.0258) 
% female -0.273 0.289 0.0994 0.193*** 0.832 0.0588 
  (0.223) (0.222) (0.192) (0.0729) (0.577) (0.211) 
Total HH asset (100,000 
yuan)  0.0737 -0.119 0.0325 -0.00316 -0.299 0.0744  
(0.0935) (0.1000) (0.0747) (0.0271) (0.361) (0.135) 
% off-farm 0.00706 0.0618 0.0486 0.0827 -0.0267 -0.418* 
  (0.223) (0.221) (0.213) (0.0740) (0.470) (0.214) 
% rice -0.106 0.159 -0.0515 0.136*** 0.100 -0.0618 
  (0.0938) (0.103) (0.0765) (0.0321) (0.263) (0.114) 
HH per capita land holding 
(mu) 
-0.00500 0.0187 -0.0200 -0.00857 0.0514 -0.0213 
(0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0121) (0.00636) (0.0453) (0.0194) 
% lined canal in village 0.0399 0.0444 -0.0658 -0.322*** -0.244 0.151 
  (0.114) (0.124) (0.0797) (0.0399) (0.297) (0.135) 
% irrigated area in village -1.024*** 1.085*** -0.921*** -0.204 1.979** -0.0342 
  (0.379) (0.379) (0.322) (0.157) (0.886) (0.478) 
Canals in village silt up easily  0.0326 -0.0222 -0.000602 -0.108*** -0.140 0.134 
(0.0937) (0.0969) (0.0972) (0.0293) (0.225) (0.0989) 
N HH per meter of canal, 
log and standardized  
0.0287 -0.0225 -0.0613* -0.0317** 0.0505 -0.0474 
(0.0437) (0.0478) (0.0362) (0.0152) (0.110) (0.0476) 
Distance to township  
government (km)  
0.00231 -0.000343 0.00133 0.00864** -0.0192 -0.00413 
(0.0119) (0.0130) (0.0103) (0.00411) (0.0334) (0.0146) 
Partial F statistics  0.92 0.65 1.19 0.65 10.06*** 1.28 
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses  
*, **, *** indicate levels of statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
